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EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS TO REINSTATE
INJURED WORKERS:
Relating Human Rights Legislation to Section 54b of the Workers'
Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, 539, as amended by S.O. 1989, c.47
David Baker and Gregory Sones*
A. INTRODUCTION
Ontario is Canada's most prosperous province, yet 50% of persons
with disabilities living in Ontario between the ages of 15-64 have total
incomes of less than $10,000 a year.1 The economic disadvantage expe-
rienced by persons with disabilities is just one consequence of the dis-
crimination that exists against them, discrimination which is so
"systematically practised" and "so widespread and so insidious as to
be almost imperceptible.' 2
Nowhere is this discrimination more clearly seen than in the area of
employment. The labour force participation rate in Ontario of persons
with disabilities is only 38.9%, compared with 77.8% for the rest of the
population.3 Yet, what these figures do not reflect is the personal and
social tragedy of so many people being excluded from employment
Discriminatory barriers in employment stigmatize persons with dis-
abilities by preventing them from making an economic contribution to
society. As the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights noted:
*Copyright * 1990 David Baker and Gregory Sones. David Baker is Executive
Director and Gregory Sones is Coordinator of Research, at the Advocacy
Resource Centre for the Handicapped, a legal clinic in Toronto which specializes
in the legal rights of persons with disabilities.
1. Office for Disabled Persons, Statistical Profile of Disabled Persons in Ontario
Volume II, (Toronto: Office for Disabled Persons, 1990) at 18. This data was
based on disabled persons who responded to Statistics Canada's 1986 Health
and Activity Limitation survey.
2. Canadian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report - 1988, (Ottawa: Cana-
dian Human Rights Commission, 1989).
3. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, Employment Equity
Availability Data Report on Designated Groups from the 1986 Census of Canada,
(Ottawa: Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, 1988) at Table
14-Ontario. The definition of persons with disabilities for this data is based
on persons with disabilities who indicated they are limited in the kind or
amount of work that they can perform.
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"Employment constitutes a key area in which the right to equality
and the equal benefit of the law must be achieved. Employment is
one way for Canadians to become fully contributing, independent
members of society."4
Indeed, the push for employment equity legislation by groups repre-
senting persons with disabilities is not only a response to the moral
claim that "we are of equal worth regardless of differences in gender,
race, ethnicity, or disability",5 but it is an acknowledgment of the sig-
nificance of work to individuals. Our society places such an important
emphasis on work that it is the means by which "most of us secure
much of our self-respect and self-esteem."'6 Yet for persons with dis-
abilities, we compound the existing stigma of being disabled by deny-
ing them the opportunity to participate in the one activity through
which many people derive their sense of self-worth, while simulta-
neously confining a majority of them to a life in poverty.
Injured workers who become disabled 7 experience the same stigma
and disadvantage faced by persons who are disabled by other causes.
Discrimination in society against persons with disabilities, regardless
of cause of disability, or whether the discrimination is intentional or
systemic, plays no favourites-all disabled persons are victimized and
deprived of their equal opportunity to participate as fully contributing
members of our society.
Two recent initiatives by the Ontario Government represent the first
significant attempt to tackle some of the employment barriers that face
persons with disabilities. In April 1988, amendments were proclaimed
to the Ontario Human Rights Code 1981 (the Code) which require
employers to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities in
4. Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights, Equality for All, (Ottawa: 1985) at
p.103.
5. Judge Rosalie Abella, Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report,
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984) at 3.
6. D.M. Beatty, Labour is not a Commodity, in BJ. Reiter and J. Swan, ed., Stud-
ies in Contract Law, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979) at 318.
7. Abt Associates of Canada, Status Report: Persons with Disabilities, (Toronto:
Ministry of Citizenship Working Group on Employment Equity, 1989) at
p.19. 23% of Ontario's population of persons with disabilities became dis-
abled as a result of an accident at work or elsewhere.
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employment unless to do so causes undue hardship.8 In 1989, Bill 162
was passed which makes significant amendments to the Workers' Com-
pensation Act (the Act), including the requirement that employers rein-
state injured workers in certain situations.9
The 'success' of these initiatives will be determined by the interpreta-
tion of 'the duty to accommodate and undue hardship' and whether
effective mechanisms exist for their enforcement. However, it should
be said that even if these initiatives are successful in removing barriers
to employment for certain individuals, the systemic employment barri-
ers that confront persons with disabilities, and the pervasive discrimi-
nation that they face in all facets of society, will not be removed
through the piecemeal' approach that these initiatives represent. 10
In the absence of employment equity legislation, the extent to which
the reinstatement provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act)
can be used to assist disabled workers in retaining employment is
unclear. The focus of this paper is to outline a standard for interpre-
ting the duty to accommodate and undue hardship under the Act and
the Code, to highlight the flaws in the process for enforcement, and to
suggest an alternative approach for addressing the systemic barriers
that exist for persons with disabilities.
B. THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT-
SECTION 54B REINSTATEMENT RIGHT:
The obligation of an employer under the Act to re-employ an injured
worker only extends to workers employed continuously for at least one
year prior to the date of the injury.11 In order for an injured worker to
avail him or herself of this right, the Board must determine that the
worker is "medically able to perform the essential duties of the
worker's pre-injury employment or is medically able to perform suit-
8. Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c.53; as am. S.O. 1984, c.58, s. 39;
and S.O. 1986, c.64, s. 18.
9. Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.539, as am. by S.O. 1989, c.47.
10. William Black, Employment Equality: A Systemic Approach, (Ottawa: Univer-
sity of Ottawa, 1985).
11. Supra, note 9 at s. 54(b)(1).
Employer Obligations to Reinstate Injured Workers
able work."12 Where the Board has previously determined that an
injured worker is able to perform suitable work, the Board can
upgrade its assessment of the capacity of the worker and determine
that the worker can perform the essential duties of the worker's pre-
injury employment.13
Once the Board has made the determination that the worker is able to
perform the essential duties of the pre-injury employment, or suitable
employment, it must notify the employer.14 The employer, upon receiv-
ing the Board's notice that the worker is able to perform the essential
duties of the pre-injury employment:
"shall offer to reinstate the worker in the position held on the date
of injury or offer to provide the worker with alternative employ-
ment of a nature and at earnings comparable to the worker's
employment on that date."15
If the Board has determined that the worker cannot perform the essen-
tial duties of pre-injury employment, but finds that the worker is medi-
cally able to perform suitable work, then on giving the employer notice
in accordance with s.s.54b(3), the employer shall:
"offer the worker the first opportunity to accept suitable employ-
ment that may become available with the employer."16
Section 54b(6) imposes a duty on the employer to accommodate the
"work or the workplace to the needs of the worker", to the extent that
the accommodation does not cause the employer undue hardship.
This section implicitly requires the Board to consider whether or not
the employer can accommodate the needs of the injured worker with-
out undue hardship when determining whether or not the injured
worker can perform the essential duties or suitable employment under
s.s.54b(2).
12. bid s. 54b(2Xa).
13. Ibid. s. 54b(2)(b).
14. Ibid. s. 54b(3).
15. Ibid. s. 54b(4).
16. Ibid. s. 54b(5).
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In addition to the requirement that the worker be employed continu-
ously for one year prior to the date of injury, the reinstatement provis-
ions only apply during a time limited period, up to a maximum of two
years after the date of injury to the worker.17 Further, the reinstate-
ment provisions do not apply in respect of employers who employ reg-
ularly fewer than 20 workers;18 classes of employers and workers as
exempted by regulations;19 and do not displace the seniority provis-
ions of a collective agreement.20 For employers engaged in the con-
struction industry, they are only required to re-employ workers who
perform construction work as prescribed by regulations.21
Under the reinstatement provisions, an employer will be presumed not
to have fulfilled the employer's obligations if the worker is terminated
within six months of reinstatement 22 In addition, a worker may apply
to the Board for a determination of whether the employer has fulfilled
the employer's obligations to the worker under s.54b.23 On finding that
the employer has not fulfilled its obligations, the Board may:
"(a) levy a penalty on the employer of a maximum of the amount
of the worker's net average earnings for the year preceding the
injury;, and
(b) make payments to the worker for a maximum of one year as if
the worker were entitled to compensation under section 40, and
subsection 40 (2) and (3) apply to the pa yents with such modifica-
tions as the circumstances may require.2 4
In the interim policy guidelines released by the Board, pending the
enactment of regulations, it has attempted to address a variety of
issues that arise out of the reinstatement provisions. One critical issue
for the successful application of s.54b is the interpretation of 'the duty
to accommodate and undue hardship'.
17. Ibid. s. 54b(8).
18. Ibid. s. 54b(16)(a).
19. Ibid. s. 54b(16)(b).
20. Ibid. s. 54b(15).
21. Ibid. s. 54b(9).
22. Ibid. s. 54b(10).
23. Ibid. s. 54b(1 1).
24. Ibid. s. 54b(13)(a)(b).
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An example of the duty to accommodate may be useful for illustrating
how this section can be applied. Ronald White was a clerk with the
Liquor Control Board of Ontario. He injured his back while lifting
cases of liquor, as he was required to do by his job description. After a
period of rehabilitation, Mr. White was ready to return to work, how-
ever, there were limits placed on the weights he could lift and the
length of time he could be lifting. The employer initially took the posi-
tion that he had to perform 100% of the functions in his job descrip-
tion. He lodged a complaint with the Human Rights Commission,
alleging it was discriminatory that he not be permitted to return to
work in "light duties". In essence, he indicated that the 5% of his job
which involved heavy lifting should be removed from his job descrip-
tion and additional duties assumed, such as stocking shelves and serv-
ing as cashier, substituted in its place. These duties were already
included in his job description.
Following three days of hearing, the Board of Inquiry ordered, on con-
sent, that Mr. White be reinstated. The terms of the Order relevant to the
issue of job restructuring, one type of accommodation, are as follows:
1. The LCBO shall return Ronald White to work forthwith to his
position of "Clerk III" with the LCBO on the basis that:
(a) the LCBO will not require Mr. White to engage in pro-
longed heavy lifting nor in prolonged frequent turning
and bending during the discharge of his tasks as a Clerk
III. More particularly:
(i) Mr. White shall not be required to participate in the
unloading process; and
(ii) Mr. White is capable of servicing the stock, replenish-
ing display racks and taking cases to the showroom
area provided that:
(a) When he picks up a case he is able to confront
the case;
(b) he is required to lift cases weighing less than
50lbs. from a height above his shoulders, subject
to his medical restrictions;
(c) he is able to transport cases using a buggy; and
(d) he does not perform this type of work continu-
ously and, when he does perform this work, he
(1990) 6 Journal of Law and Social Policy
works at a pace consistent with his disability
and medical conditions.
In addition, he was given full compensation, retroactive to the date his
doctor decided he had been capable of returning to work5
With respect to the duty to accommodate under s.54b(6), the Board
has indicated in its interim guidelines that "the determination of
whether an injured worker can perform the essential duties of the pre-
injury job, or whether work available with the employer is suitable,
will be made in light of any accommodation required to be under-
taken by the employer."26 This approach to the duty to accommodate
incorporates the approach to be used under the Code for determining
whether or not a disabled person is capable of performing the essen-
tial duties of a position.27
However, s.54b has a slightly different emphasis from the Code in that
"essential duties" is important for determining whether the worker is
reinstated to "pre-injury employment or alternative employment" or
"suitable employment that may become available with the employer".
If the worker's needs cannot be accommodated without undue hard-
ship with respect to the essential duties of the pre-injury employment,
the employer must offer the worker suitable employment that becomes
available-only when the employer cannot offer suitable employment
because the cost of accommodating the needs of the worker would
result in undue hardship, does the worker lose his or her right to rein-
statement. In other words, the Workers' Compensation Act guarantees an
injured worker the right to return to work, unless the cost of making
the worker productive would result in an undue hardship.
As for the standard for determining whether or not the accommoda-
tion would result in undue hardship, the Board has indicated it will
have regard2 to the guidelines on accommodation produced by the
25. White v. Liquor Control Board of Ontario (August 1985), Order of Frederick
Zemans [unreported].
26. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Interim Guidelines on Reinstatement -
Accommodation under s. 54b(6), (Toronto: Workers' Compensation Board,
1990).
27. Supra, note 8 at s. 16.
28. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Interim Guidelines on Reinstatement -
Undue Hardship under s. 54(b)(6), (Toronto: Workers' Compensation Board,
1990).
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Ontario Human Rights Commission.29 In that the Act does not man-
date the Board to prescribe standards for assessing what is undue
hardship, it would appear that the legislative intent of s.54b(6) is to
incorporate into the Act the standard for undue hardship under the
Code. Support for this is found in the remarks made by the Minister of
Labour, Gregory Sorbara, before the Standing Committee on
Resources Development, and the notes that accompanied his remarks,
when introducing amendments to Bill 162. The Minister expressed his
view that the standard for undue hardship under the Act should be the
same as that under the Code.30
Given the legislative intent under the Act, the extent to which employ-
ers will be required to reinstate workers will ultimately depend on how
the duty to accommodate and undue hardship is interpreted. For that,
we must turn to the interpretation of the equivalent sections in the
Code.
C. THE DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE AND UNDUE
HARDSHIP UNDER THE ONTARIO HUMAN
RIGHTS CODE
In September 1989, the Ontario Human Rights Commission released
its "Guidelines for Assessing Accommodation Requirements for Per-
sons with Disabilities"? 1 It is submitted that the approach proposed
by the Commission for the interpretation of the duty to accommodate
and undue hardship should be adopted by boards of inquiry and the
courts as it is entirely consistent with the history and evolution of the
Code, and the purpose which underlies it.
1. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AS A PRINCIPLE WHICH
UNDERLIES THE CODE
The history and evolution of human rights in Ontario shows that the
fundamental purpose which underlies the Code is the promotion and
29. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Guidelines for Assessing Accommodation
Requirements for Persons with Disabilities, (Toronto: Ministry of Citizenship,
1989).
30. Ontario Ministry of Labour, Material on Proposed Government Amendments to
Bill 162, An Act to Amend the Workers' Compensation Act, (Toronto: released
by the Ministry of Labour May 25, 1990).
31. Supra, note 29.
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protection of equal opportunity. Equal opportunity is a principle
which is concerned with enabling "a person to choose and pursue his
or her own goals and purposes in life."32 In other words, equal oppor-
tunity is concerned with "equality of self-defmition and self-govern-
ment, or equality in liberty and autonomy for short" 33 In a decision
under the Canadian Human Rights Act, the importance of this principle
was described in these terms:
"Equality of opportunity" is a value of a pluralistic society which
believes in the inherent or fundamental freedom of all members of
society to achieve self-development and self-realization."34
In 1982, the protection of the Code was extended to persons with dis-
abilities. With this enactment, the provincial government took the first
step in recognizing that disabled persons were morally deserving of
equal respect and consideration in Ontario society. Following the deci-
sion in OMalley,35 which recognized the concept of adverse impact
discrimination and the duty to accommodate under the old Code, the
next logical step occurred in 1988, when the amendments on accom-
modation were proclaimed. By prohibiting discriminatory treatment
against persons with disabilities, and by requiring that the needs of
persons with disabilities be accommodated unless to do so resulted in
undue hardship, the Code established a framework which has as its
intent the removal of barriers that prevent persons with disabilities
from achieving self-realization. Without the duty to accommodate, the
principle of equal opportunity that the Code promotes would have
been an empty shell for persons with disabilities.
The inclusion of the duty to accommodate has opened the doors to
society for persons with disabilities; the deaf have the right to inter-
preters at work or closed-captioned videos for entertainment at home,
32. David Beatty, Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutional Labour Code,
(Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986) at 3.
33. Ibid. at 3.
34. Mahon v. Canadian Pacific Limited (1985), 85 C.L.L.C. 16,201 at 16,205 (Cdn.
Human Rights Tribunal), reversed on other grounds (1987), 8 C.H.R.R.
D/4263 (Fed. C.A.).
35. Re Ontario Human Rights Commission et al. v. Simpsons-Sears Limited (1985),
[19861 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.).
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the blind can require that print-media be provided to them in accessi-
ble form, and wheelchair users have the right to accessible transit. The
door has been opened, persons with disabilities are receiving their first
tastes of freedom, and becoming aware that just maybe they too can
share the same dreams and aspirations of the non-disabled. Unfortu-
nately, it is a fragile freedom-whereas it is now inconceivable that the
Berlin Wall will ever be resurrected- persons with disabilities face the
prospect that the door to their own society will be shut once again.
Whether the door will stay open, or be shut, depends on the interpre-
tation of undue hardship under the Code, and whether the vision of
equal opportunity that underlies the Code is respected.
How our vision of equal opportunity has evolved is critical in deter-
mining the approach which should be adopted by courts and tribunals
when interpreting the duty to accommodate and undue hardship pro-
visions of the Code.
In recent Ontario history there has been a succession of anti-discrimi-
nation legislation beginning with the Racial Discrimination Act, S.O.
1944, c.51; the Fair Employment Practices Act, S.O. 1951, c.24; the Female
Employees Fair Remuneration Act, S.O. 1951, c.26; the Fair Accommoda-
tion Practices Act, S.O. 1954, c.28; the Ontario Anti-Discrimination Com-
mission Act, S.O. 1958, c.70; and the Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O.
1961-62, c.93 which consolidated the previously mentioned statutes.3 6
The legislative intent behind these statutes was to provide that in cer-
tain spheres of activity certain people should be free from experienc-
ing certain kinds of discrimination in their dealings with other people.
In the Legislative Assembly, Premier Frost stated:
"It is our belief that, as a people in Ontario, all men, of whatever
race, colour or creed, must be accorded equity and the fundamental
rights of the human person; equity and respect to man's dignity,
equity before the law, and equity in rights of employment"37
36. Also see J David Baker, "The Changing Norms of Equality in the Supreme
Court of Canada', (1987) 9 Supreme Court Law Review 497.
37. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates vol.XXIX at A-10 (13 March 1951).
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In the early days of anti-discrimination legislation, the discourse was
concerned with freedom,3 8 which was quite understandable given the
desire to implement legislation which would conform with the spirit of
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a reaction to
the growth of communism both at home and abroad.39 However, this
discourse should not obscure the realization that these Acts, and in
particular the 1962 Code were ultimately concerned with the principle
of equal opportunity.
The Minister of Labour, in a speech to the Legislative Assembly con-
firmed this when he stated:
"With us in Ontario it has always been a basic principle that every-
one should have an equal opportunity to direct his life toward what
he thinks will be the most rewarding objectives. The legislation now
before us is, I believe, a major step forward in assuring everyone in
this province an equal opportunity toward this end."40
Anti-discrimination legislation was intended, at that time, to provide
for equal opportunity by limiting the impact of attitudinal discrimina-
tion, thereby lessening "artificial barriers denying equality of opportu-
nity."41
Although limited in scope and application, an important principle can
be drawn from these early attempts to deal with discrimination. The
purpose of human rights legislation was to enable individuals to par-
ticipate in society free from restraints which were considered contrary
to principles of freedom, dignity, equal opportunity and ultimately
democracy.42 Of particular importance was the notion that persons
should have the opportunity to participate in the development of
Ontario as a province. Discrimination was not only an affront to per-
38. Ibid. at A-7; and T.M. Eberlee & D.G. Hill, 'The Ontario Human Rights Coder ,
(1963-64) 15 U.T.LJ. 448.
39. J.C. Bagnall, The Ontario Conservatives and the Development of Anti-Discrimina-
tion Policy 1944-62, (Ph.d thesis, Queen's University, 1984) [unpublished], dis-
cusses the concerns which contributed to the development of the Fair
Employment Practices Act.
40. K.W. Warrender, Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates at 419 (14 December
1961).
41. K.W. Warrender, Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates, at 554 (22 February
1962).
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sonal dignity, but an impediment to the economic well-being of the
province.43
Speaking in the Legislative Assembly during the debate on the Human
Rights Code, Premier Robarts implicitly referred to the link between
equal opportunity and the economic and social well-being of the prov-
ince, when he stated:
"I would point out to you what we are trying to accomplish with
legislation of this type. There are two principal and closely interre-
lated purposes. The first is to make secure in law the inalienable
right of every person, and the second is to create at the local com-
munity level in our society a climate of understanding and mutual
respect among all our people, so that every person, new Canadian
no less than native born, will be afforded the unhampered opportu-
nity to contribute his maximum to the enrichment of our society, of
our province and our nation."4 4
Further confirmation that human rights legislation was concerned
with the promotion and protection of equality of opportunity is found
five years later with the introduction of a bill to prevent discrimination
in employment because of age. In introducing this legislation, the
Minister of Labour said:
"One of the principles upon which all the members of this House
are united is the importance of assuring to the people of this prov-
ince the fullest measure of equality of opportunity. This principle
has been and is being forwarded in many ways, not the least of
which is through the legislation now placed before the House."45
Boards of Inquiry have also acknowledged that this purpose underlies
human rights legislation.46 In Singh v. Security Investigation Services
Ltd., Chairperson Cumming wrote in his judgment:
43. Bagnall, supra, note 39. Bagnall's main thesis is that anti-discrimination legisla-
tion was crucial as one element in a strategy to guarantee Ontario's economic
development through the recruitment of non-British immigrants, at a time when
there was difficulty in getting skilled immigrants to come to Canada. The paral-
lels with today are striking, one of the primary government justifications for
employment equity is so that labour market shortages can be ameliorated by
including in the labour market people who have previously been excluded,
including persons with disabilities.
44. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates at 559 (22 February 1962).
45. H.L. Rowntree, Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates at 589 (16 February
1966).
46. Gordon v. Papadropoulos (May 1968), (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry) [unreported].
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"The policy underlying this legislation is to provide the many reli-
gious, racial and ethnic groups of Ontario, a culturally plural soci-
ety, with both equality of respect and equality of opportunity."47
The Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981 expressly incorporated the con-
cept of equal opportunity into the Code. The preamble to the Code
contains the following statement of policy:
"WHEREAS recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foun-
dation of freedom, justice and peace in the world and is in accord
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as proclaimed by
the United Nations;
AND WHEREAS it is public policy in Ontario to recognize the
dignity and worth of every person and to provide for equal rights
and opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to law,
and having as its aim the creation of a climate of understanding
and mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each person so that
each person feels a part of the community and able to contribute
fully to the development and well-being of the community and the
Province;
AND WHEREAS these principles have been confirmed in Ontario
by a number of enactments of the Legislature and it is desirable to
revise and extend the protection of human rights legislation in
Ontario... -48
The legislative history, and legal interpretation, of early anti-discrimi-
nation initiatives shows unequivocally that human rights legislation
has as its purpose the elimination of certain types of discriminatory
barriers that restrict or deny equality of opportunity.
In addition, recognition must be given to the changes that have
occurred with respect to our understanding of the barriers that face
persons who aspire to equal opportunity. As far back as 1961, it was
acknowledged in Ontario that "new needs" may become apparent
requiring changes in the Code.49 Indeed, from 1961 up until, and
including the overhaul of the Code in 1981, the grounds of protection
were extended from race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry or place
47. Singh v. Security Investigation Services Ltd. (1977), at 17 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry)
[unreported].
48. Supra, note 8.
49. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates at 419 (14 December 1961).
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of origin, to include ethnic origin, citizenship, sex, age, marital status,
family status, handicap, receipt of public assistance and record of
offenses. Further, when one examines the activities to which protection
of the Code is extended, it is clear that they are linked to the premise
of equal opportunity. By prohibiting discrimination in the provision of
services, goods and facilities; 50 the occupancy of accommodation;51
the right to contract on equal terms;52 employment;53 and membership
in trade unions, trade or occupational associations and self-governing
professions54 the Code seeks to ensure that all individuals have the
equal opportunity to participate in society's most important activities.
It is clear that our approach to promoting and protecting equal oppor-
tunity has evolved based on the needs of groups which face barriers to
participation in society, and who are disadvantaged as a consequence
of those barriers. This evolution is further manifested in the develop-
ment which other concepts contained in the Code have undergone.
In part one of the Code individuals have "the right to equal treatment
without discrimination." 55 As part of the evolution to a more sensitive
protection from discriminatory barriers, the symbolic and legal mean-
ing of "the right to equal treatment without discrimination", is signifi-
cant. In the first decision under the 1981 Code, Chairperson Cumming
stated that the new Code "emphasizes affirmatively the rights of the indi-
vidual, rather than simply implicitly affirming such rights by prohibiting
the conduct of the discriminator."s6 Such an approach to human rights is
consistent with a legislative scheme that is more concerned with the
impact of the discrimination on its victims, than punishing the discrimi-
nators, 7 in other words promoting the objective of achieving equal
opportunity over the punishment of people who deny it.
50. Supra, note 8 at s. 1.
51. Ibid. at s. 2.
52. Ibid. at s. 3.
53. Ibid. at s. 4.
54. Ibid. at s. 5.
55. Ibid. at ss. 1-5.
56. Cameron v. Nel-Gor Castle Nursing Home (1984), 5 C.H.R.R. D/2170 at 2174
(Ont. Bd. of Inquiry).
57. Supra, note 35 at 329.
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The significance of this language is further enhanced by the recogni-
tion in Canada that equal treatment does not always mean identical
treatment. It may also mean different treatment 58 Indeed, the concept
of the duty to accommodate is based on this premise,59 for it is now
recognized that identical treatment can result in serious inequality.60
This language, and its interpretation by the courts, represents a rejec-
tion of the formal norm of equality, a norm associated with the con-
cept of identical treatment 61 It confirms that the 1981 Code is
primarily concerned with the removal of barriers that prevent a sub-
stantive realization of the equal opportunity to participate in the com-
munity.
This approach to equal opportunity, and by extension the requirement
that the needs of persons with disabilities be accommodated, including
allocating resources of advantaged members of society for that pur-
pose, finds support from an article, "Justice and Equality",62 by Greg-
ory Vlastos. After elaborating on his example of the visitor from Mars
who questions the distribution of police resources that are allocated to
X who is threatened by Murder, Inc. Vlastos writes:
"So we can see why the distribution according to personal need, far
from conflicting with the equality of distribution required by a
human right, is so linked with its very meaning that under ideal
conditions equality of right would coincide with distribution
according to personal need. Our visitor misunderstood the sudden
mobilization of New York policemen in favour of Mr. X, because
he failed to understand that it is benefits to persons, not allocation
of resources as such, that are meant to be made equal; for then he
would have seen at once that unequal distribution of resources
would be required to equalize benefits in cases of unequal need.
But if he saw this he might then ask 'But why do you want this
sort of equality?' My answer would have to be: Because the human
worth of all persons is equal, however unequal may be their
merit. '6 3
58. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) at 13;
R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985) 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 347.
59. Supra, note 5 at 3.
60. Supra, note 58 at 10.
61. Supra, note 36 at p.501.
62. G. Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in R. Brandt, ed., Social Justice, (NJ.:
Prentice Hall, 1962) at 31.
63. Ibid. at 42-43.
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Differential treatment for persons with disabilities, by accommodating
their needs, is nothing more than an allocation of resources intended
to ensure that persons with disabilities have the equal benefit of equal
opportunity. By imposing a duty to accommodate persons with disabil-
ities under the Act and the Code, the legislature has decided that
employers, service providers and landlords have the primary responsi-
bility for ensuring that persons with disabilities enjoy the equal benefit
of equal opportunity.
It should be stated that if employers, service providers and landlords
were cognizant of the exclusionary impact of their decision-making,
many of the barriers that face persons with disabilities could be elimi-
nated through inclusive planning which focuses on accessibility for all.
True equality will not be achieved by removing barriers that are con-
stantly being created, rather it will be achieved when the barriers are
not built in the first place.
The evolution in the concept of discrimination takes this protection
even further-no longer does human rights legislation only protect
people from direct discrimination, it is equally concerned with actions
which have an unintended effect As Mr. Justice McIntyre noted in
Andrews:
"discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether inten-
tional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteris-
tics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing
burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group
not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members
of society." 4
The concepts contained within human rights legislation, such as the
right to equal treatment and the meaning of discrimination, have
evolved. They do so in response to the changes in our conception of
equal opportunity and desire to remove barriers that prevent people
from fully participating in the community. The interpretation of these
concepts should not dictate the vision of equal opportunity being pro-
moted by the Code; on the contrary, their interpretation should reflect
the principles and purpose which underlies it. Similarly, the interpreta-
tion of the duty to accommodate and undue hardship should not
64. Andrews, supra, note 58 at 18.
(1990) 6 Journal of Law and Social Policy
determine the vision of equal opportunity. Both concepts must be
interpreted in accordance with the purpose of the legislation which is
to maximize the promotion and protection of equal opportunity.
By identifying the promotion and protection of equal opportunity as
the fundamental purpose which underlies human rights legislation, it
clarifies the context within which human rights legislation should be
interpreted. The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted this approach
in its leading decision on the interpretation of human rights legisla-
tion.65 Mr. Justice McIntyre describes it as follows:
"To begin with, we must consider the nature and purpose of
human rights legislation. The preamble to the Ontario Human
Rights Code provides the guide and is worth quoting in full...
There we find enunciated the broad policy of the Code and it is
this policy which should have effect. It is not, in my view, a sound
approach to say that according to established rules of construction
no broader meaning can be given to the Code than the narrowest
interpretation of the words employed. The accepted rules of con-
struction are flexible enough to enable the court to recognize in the
construction of a human rights code the special nature and purpose
of the enactment... and give to it an interpretation which will
advance its broad purposes. Legislation of this type is of a special
nature, not quite constitutional but certainly more than ordinal-
and it is for the courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect.2-
The Supreme Court of Canada has provided clear direction for inter-
preting the provisions of the Code. Boards of Inquiry and the courts
should seek to give liberal effect to the meaning of the Code by ensur-
ing that the substantive provisions are interpreted in a manner which
maximizes the promotion of equality of opportunity to participate,
while minimizing the impact of the limitations and exemptions to this
principle that exist within the Code. Only by extending this approach
to the interpretation of the duty to accommodate and undue hardship
will persons with disabilities have the equal benefit of equal opportu-
nity.
2. THE DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
Prior to the amendments to the Code, the Supreme Court of Canada
had held in O'Malley, that a duty to accommodate did exist under the
Code. Mr Justice McIntyre stated:
65. Supra, note 35.
66. Ibid. at 328-329.
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"Accepting the proposition that there is a duty to accommodate
imposed on the employer, it becomes necessary to put some realis-
tic limit upon it The duty in a case of adverse effect discrimination
on the basis of religion or creed is to take reasonable steps to
accommodate the complainant, short of undue hardship: in other
words, to take such steps as may be reasonable to accommodate
without undue interference in the operation of the employer's busi-
ness and without undue expense to the employer."67
The decision in OMalley was a significant milestone for human rights
legislation in Ontario. Not only did it incorporate an adverse impact
analysis into the concept of discrimination, but it recognized that the
duty to accommodate existed in human rights legislation. Despite its
significance, it must be stated unequivocally that the approach to the
duty to accommodate and undue hardship outlined by Mr. Justice Mc-
Intyre is no longer valid in Ontario.
In 1986, after the Supreme Court's decision, the Ontario Legislature
amended the Code. A legislated duty to accommodate persons with
disabilities was made explicit Section 16(la) reads as follows:
"(la) The Commission, a board of inquiry or a court shall not find
a person incapable unless it is satisfied that the needs of the person
cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the person
responsible for accommodating those needs, considering the cost,
outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety require-
ments, if any."
A comparable objective is contained in section 10(2) covering cases of
constructive discrimination.
Section 16(la) contains three factors which are to be considered in
assessing whether an accommodation would result in undue hardship:
a) the cost of the accommodation; b) outside sources of funding for
the accommodation; and c) health and safety requirements.
By specifying the factors to be considered in determining whether an
accommodation could be made without undue hardship, the Ontario
Legislature rejected two elements contained in Mr. Justice McIntyre's
test. First, the Legislature did not use the language of "reasonable
accommodation", language which up until that time was widely used.
In its place, it substituted the concept of "accommodation without
67. Thi at 335.
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undue hardship". This language is absolute -the only justification for
not making an accommodation is when to do so would result in an
undue hardship. The balancing of interests under the Code is deci-
sively tilted in favour of complainants by this language, the result
being that the interests of the respondent need only be considered
when an undue hardship results. This is entirely consistent with the
Code's purpose of ameliorating conditions of disadvantagement, even
when doing so imposes burdens on advantaged members of society.68
Secondly, after intense debate, and with the support of all parties in
the legislature, the inclusion of "business inconvenience" as a ground
for determining undue hardship was removed.69 The change was
intended to significantly increase the obligation placed on respon-
dents. As such, undue interference in the employer's business or busi-
ness inconvenience should not be considered a factor in determining
undue hardship.
To-date, there are no reported decisions based on this section. How-
ever, to provide guidance to service providers, landlords and employ-
ers, as well as to persons with disabilities, the Ontario Human Rights
Commission decided that it would issue guidelines containing its
interpretation of the duty to accommodate and undue hardship.
In developing its interpretation of this section, the Commission
engaged in extensive consultation with business, labour and commu-
nity groups. The product of this consultation was the Commission's
guidelines. The guidelines contain nine sections which encompass
such issues as: standards for accommodation; 70 standards for assess-
ing undue hardship;71 respecting the dignity of persons with disabili-
ties;72 and demonstrating undue hardship.73
The guidelines contain a coherent framework for determining whether
an accommodation could be made without undue hardship. Persons
68. Supra, note 8 at s. 13.
69. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates at pp. 406 0-4 (9 December 1986).
70. Supra, note 29 at 5.
71. Ibid. at 7-15.
72. Ibid. at 16-17.
73. Ibid. at 18-19.
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with disabilities are to be accommodated in a manner which respects
their dignity, maximizes their integration and promotes their full par-
ticipation in society.74 The scope of this duty to accommodate is lim-
ited only to the degree that the accommodation would result in an
undue hardship either because of cost75 or for health and safety rea-
sons.76 In addition, the respondent must establish that the needs of the
person with a disability cannot be accommodated by alternative
means where on first analysis the accommodation would result in an
undue hardship.77
To establish that the cost of the accommodation would result in an
undue hardship, the respondent must show that the costs of the
accommodation "would alter the essential nature or would substan-
tially affect the viability of the enterprise responsible"78 for the accom-
modation. With respect to undue hardship because of health and
safety requirements, the respondent must show that "the degree of risk
which remains after the accommodation has been made outweighs the
benefit of enhancing equality for disabled persons."79
It is submitted that the Commission's interpretation of the cost stan-
dard should be adopted by boards of inquiry and the courts. It is the
only standard which is consistent with the legislative purpose that
underlies the Code: the promotion and protection of equal opportunity.
To achieve this objective, the duty to accommodate recognizes that
advantaged members of society have to bear the full cost of providing
accommodation so to assist disadvantaged persons or groups in
achieving equal opportunity. How these advantaged members pay for
the cost is not an issue, although the Commission recognizes the array
of options available in the private sector for financing more costly
accommodations. The limitation on this principle is where it would
alter the essential nature or substantially affect the viability of the
74. Ibid. at 5.
75. Ibid. at 8.
76. Ibid. at 12.
77. Ibid. at 16-17.
78. Ibid. at 8.
79. Ibid. at 12.
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enterprise. Any standard less than this would be to ignore the Code's
purpose and its legislative framework.
The second standard which has to be met relates to health and safety
requirements. The interaction between health and safety requirements
and human rights legislation continues to be problematic for persons
with disabilities. The standard proposed by the Commission is that
undue hardship will be shown to exist where the degree of risk which
remains after the accommodation outweighs the benefits of enhancing
equal opportunity. As with the cost standard, the standard proposed
by the Commission is consistent with principles of equal opportunity.
It should be stated that in determining whether or not an undue hard-
ship will exist because of health and safety considerations, recognition
should be given to the concept of "dignity of risk." This concept allows
disabled persons to decide whether or not they wish to assume health
and safety risks that they alone face. As part of the concept, employers
should be required to explain any potential risk to the disabled person
that would arise due to the employment of the disabled person, and
allow that person to decide if he or she will assume the risk.80 Clearly,
this is a concept which also allows disabled persons to refuse to accept
a position when they do not want to assume a higher risk to their
health and safety than faced by coworkers. In the context of reinstate-
ment under the Act, injured workers should not be forced to accept
reinstatement to a position when they believe that an accommodation
(which has not been made) is required to ensure that they face no
higher risk of injury than other workers, or where no accommodation
is possible that will alleviate the risk.
Through its guidelines, the Commission has provided an interpreta-
tion of the duty to accommodate and undue hardship which will facil-
itate persons with disabilities being able to choose and pursue their
own goals and purposes in life, thereby enabling them to have the
equal benefit of equal opportunity. To accomplish this objective, the
Legislature decided that the cost for achieving equal opportunity
would be borne by respondents, unless it would result in an undue
hardship. Consistent with the framework of the Code to promote the
amelioration of disadvantagement, the standard for undue hardship
recognizes that in situations where an accommodation is required,
80. bid at 13.
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advantaged members of society will have to bear the cost of the
accommodation.
The purpose of this approach is to allow persons with disabilities to
become autonomous, having a choice as to where they can work or
shop, or the form of entertainment they engage in, the type of educa-
tion they can receive or to travel to places that have been inaccessible.
It allows persons with disabilities to experience what advantaged
members of society take for granted and will enable persons with dis-
abilities to choose their own goals and purposes in life. Without this
high standard for undue hardship, barriers will remain, and persons
with disabilities will continue to be denied the recognition and respect
that they morally deserve. A low threshold for establishing undue
hardship will close the door to freedom for persons with disabilities.
D. INTERACTION BETWEEN S.54B AND
THE ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS CODE:
To this point it has been argued that the interpretation of undue hard-
ship under the Act should be the same as the interpretation under the
Code, and the standard to be adopted should be that proposed by the
Ontario Human Rights Commission in its guidelines on accommoda-
tion and undue hardship. Such a standard clearly promotes and pro-
tects the right to participate of persons with disabilities, including
injured workers.
Through the application of the duty to accommodate, and the
Commission's standard on undue hardship, employers will be
required to provide at minimum the following types of accommoda-
tion: a) human support services such as attendant care, readers for the
blind and interpreters for the deaf; b) communication services such as
converting print to braille or enlarged print; c) technical aids and
devices; d) workstation and building modifications; e) job restructur-
ing of not only the disabled worker's position but also co-workers; and
f) the modification of employment policies and practices.
Given the broad range of accommodation that is required, and the
high standard for showing undue hardship, it should be the rare case
when the Board determines that the needs of the worker cannot be
accommodated and that he or she is unable to perform the pre-injury
or suitable employment. Board officials should be actively involved in
monitoring the worker's rehabilitation, recommending modifications to
the work or worksite and determining in the first instance when a
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worker has a right to be reinstated. In addition, when the cost of an
accommodation would result in an undue hardship, the Board should
offer to pay for part of the cost of the accommodation.
However, one possible limitation may arise with respect to suitable
employment, depending on whether it is given a broad or narrow
interpretation. In its interim policy guidelines the Board states: "suit-
able employment is any job which the worker has the necessary skills
to perform, is medically able to perform and which does not pose a
health or safety hazard to the worker or fellow workers."81 The Board
has indicated that for the purposes of determining whether the worker
has the skills for the suitable employment, the vocational and educa-
tional history of the worker should be considered.
Clearly, the issue arises as to who will be responsible for the voca-
tional rehabilitation of the injured worker so that he or she can per-
form the duties of suitable employment. Without proper skills and
training, it is unlikely that reinstatement in suitable employment will
be successful. Under the Act, if the worker is receiving or has received
s.40 benefits, the Board must offer a vocational rehabilitation assess-
ment and where necessary provide vocational rehabilitation. Where it
is determined that the worker cannot perform the essential duties of
the pre-injury employment, the Board should analyze other positions
available within the employer's workforce of comparable pay and pro-
vide the worker with appropriate training. The Board must ensure that
injured workers have the opportunity to be fully productive. The right
to reinstatement with respect to suitable employment should include a
duty on the employer to restructure a position around the disabled
worker, unless the employer can show that the worker would not be
productive in any capacity. Without this requirement, the suitable
employment provision will not be given its full effect.
Despite the high standard that should be applied for interpreting the
duty to accommodate and undue hardship, several flaws exist with
respect to the process by which injured workers can protect their right
to work under both statutes. It is ironic that the Board, which is ide-
ally suited by its mandate, and resources available to it, to ensure the
81. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Interim Guidelines on Reinstatement -
Suitable Employment, (Toronto: Workers' Compensation Board, 1990).
82. Supra, note 24.
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speedy reinstatement of injured workers, does not have the authority to
order reinstatement under s.54b. The Board can only financially
penalize the employer, a penalty which may be modest at best.82 In
effect, the injured worker's right to reinstatement under the Act may be
determined solely by whether it is cheaper for the employer to refuse
to reinstate than make the accommodation, without any regard for the
worker's sense of dignity and self-worth.
Mandatory reinstatement is only available under the Code,83 and
unfortunately this process is slow. The Commission's current com-
plaint backlog makes speedy resolution possible only in cases where
conciliation results in a settlement. It seems improbable that cases
brought by injured workers to the Commission will be settled quickly;
if the employer has refused to reinstate under the Act, rejected media-
tion and been penalized by the Board, it is hard to envisage an
employer settling a complaint. Given that it can take several years
before a case goes before a Board of Inquiry, the actual protection
available to injured workers under both the Act and the Code may not
be satisfactory.
Despite these flaws, on first being denied reinstatement the injured
worker would be well advised to make an application to the Board as
well as a complaint to the Commission. Under the Code, such a com-
plaint would not be dismissed unless the legal issue to be determined
is precisely the same as under the Act,84 unlikely in that the Code is
solely concerned with whether discrimination has occurred and s.54b
is only concerned with whether the injured worker should be rein-
stated. In fact, the possibility of dual complaints appears to have been
contemplated by the government when it used different language to
define the capacity test, established rigid time frames in the Act and
left a broader range of remedies under the Code. Further, by pursuing
a remedy under both the Act and the Code the injured worker is more
likely to be fully compensated for any damages experienced as a result
of the refusal to reinstate.
83. Under s. 40(lXa) of the Code, supra, note 8, a Board of Inquiry has the power to
order the hiring or reinstatement of a complainant who has been discriminated
against
84. Ambro Holdings v. Purcell (1986), (Ont. Div. Ct.)[unreported decision]; Re Met-
ropolitan Commissioners of Police and Ontario Human Rights Commission
(1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 48 (Div.Ct.); and Burke v. Canadian Human Rights Com-
mission (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4824 (Fed. CA.).
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In addition, in some instances the Code will be the only protection
available to an injured worker. One distinction of note between the
two pieces of legislation is the contrasting degree of paramountcy to be
accorded the obligation to accommodate. A disabled person cannot
contract out of his/her rights under either piece of legislation. Never-
theless, the reinstatement rights contained in section 54b of the Act are
expressly subordinated to the seniority provisions of collective agree-
ments. Human rights legislation, on the other hand, has been found to
be "quasi-constitutional '8 5 and to be paramount not only to private
agreements (e.g., collective agreements) but also other pieces of legisla-
tion which do not specifically indicate a contrary intention.
While the Act represents a first attempt to respond to the position of
disadvantage that many injured workers find themselves in, and incor-
porates the concept of duty to accommodate and undue hardship from
human rights legislation, the Act relies primarily on the goodwill of
employers in order for the injured worker to be reinstated. To over-
come this flaw, and strengthen the effectiveness of the legislation, the
Board and Commission should explore working together. To begin
with the Board must apply the standard for undue hardship proposed
by the Commission. Secondly, the Commission should notify employ-
ers that failure to reinstate injured workers after being given notice by
the Board that the injured worker is able to return to work, and upon
the filing of a complaint by the injured worker or the Board, will
result in a fast-track investigation by the Commission and the appoint-
ment of a Board of Inquiry if no settlement is agreed upon. Thirdly,
and perhaps most importantly, boards of inquiry and the courts must
interpret the duty to accommodate and undue hardship in a manner
which is consistent with the broad policy purposes that underlie the
Code, and should apply the standard developed by the Commission in
its guidelines.
E. CONCLUSION:
Clearly, with its recent initiatives in the area of workers' compensation
and human rights legislation, the Ontario government has decided
that as a matter of policy there are many disabled people who are
capable of working but currently lack the opportunity. Further support
85. Winnipeg School Division No.) v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150.
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for this is bolstered by reforms in the area of social assistance,8 6 where
the major thrust of the reform is to ensure that disabled people are
better off working than on welfare.
Through its initiatives in the area of human rights and workers' com-
pensation legislation, the province has decided that employers have
the primary obligation for ensuring that persons with disabilities enjoy
the equal benefit of equal opportunity in employment. By establishing
a high standard for the duty to accommodate and undue hardship, the
Commission is trying to ensure that this commitment to equal oppor-
tunity becomes a reality.
Unfortunately, the process for achieving equal opportunity through
human rights legislation is haphazard, and it is not clear whether
courts will be willing to recognize the legitimate claims of disabled
persons to equal opportunity and require respondents to allocate the
level of resources that will be required in certain situations in order to
accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities.
To address the inequalities that exist in employment, and to guarantee
persons with disabilities the equal opportunity to participate, legisla-
tion is required that addresses the systemic barriers that exist in edu-
cation and employment Mandatory employment equity legislation
which establishes goals and timetables for the hiring of persons with
disabilities, and stringent penalties for failure to comply, is the only
way to redress the position of disadvantage that is experienced by
most persons with disabilities.87 Similarly, legislation in the area of
education and skills development should be passed which would
require that organizations remove the barriers that prevent persons
with disabilities from participating in these programs.
Employment equity legislation provides a coherent and systematic
method for removing the barriers that deny persons with disabilities
the equal opportunity to participate. Such legislation is a logical exten-
sion of the policy direction represented by the Act and the Code
because:
86. For example, the Ministry of Community and Social Services has introduced a
program designed to make it easier for social assistance recipients to be part of
the workforce. See Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Sup-
ports to Employment Program.
87. Supra, note 5; also see Cathy Walker, 'The Employment Rights of People
with Disabilities, (1990) 20 Rehabilitation Digest 14.
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i) it ensures the fair distribution amongst competitors of the
obligation to accommodate;
ii) it encourages employers to act proactively to use scarce
resources to remove systemic barriers which exclude large
groups of disabled people, rather than reactively in
response to expensive and adversarial litigation for indi-
vidual cases;
iii) it rewards the kind of progressive recruitment and flexi-
ble management which will not only ensure improved
job opportunities for disabled people, but will maximize
their productivity and safety.88
By adopting employment equity legislation, many of the deficiencies
that arise out of the Act and the Code will be resolved.
88. See generally, J. David Baker, Anticipating !he Next Generation of Equality Issues
in Employment for Disabled People in Canada, in Human Rights in Canada into the
1990"r and Beyond, (Ottawa, University of Ottawa, forthcoming).
